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The Affordable Care Act Individual Coverage
Requirement:
Ways to Frame the Commerce Clause Issue
Wendy K. Mariner,JD., LL.M., MP.H.*
"This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers.... But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted,is perpetually arising,and will probably continue to arise,as long
as our system shall exist.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The central constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act ("ACA") has been to the requirement that American
citizens and legal residents maintain health insurance coverage, whether
2
from public programs or private insurers. The challengers argue that this
requirement is beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause,3
because it regulates individuals within a single state and not having health
insurance is neither economic nor activity.
This is indeed a novel issue, but it may not be the correct one. The
Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Law, Professor of
Law, Boston University School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences, Boston
University School of Medicine. Thanks to George J. Annas, Leonard H. Glantz, Mark A.
Hall and my students for provocative discussions of the subject and to Christopher Kornak
for research assistance.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010), (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) ("an applicable individual
shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of
the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage
for such month"). Exceptions are included.
3. "Congress shall have power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. Five major decisions were issued before August 15, 2011, with three upholding the
requirement (Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039 (6th Cir.
June 29, 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Liberty Univ.,
Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010)) and two striking it down
(State of Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. Aug.
12, 2011); Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768
(E.D. Va., Dec. 13, 2010)).
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challengers' argument relies on part of a particular three-category
formulation of what Congress can regulate by exercising its commerce
power, first stated in this particular formulation in Perez v. United States:
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems.
First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which
Congress deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of
stolen goods ... or of persons who have been kidnapped .... Second,
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for
example, the destruction of an aircraft . . . , or persons or things in
commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments ....

Third,

those activities affecting commerce.5
Challengers argue, and the federal government and most courts seem to
accept, that only the third category - activities affecting commerce - is at
issue; they have not yet explicitly addressed the first two. 6 However, there
may be other ways to frame the question. The requirement might be
analyzed as an incidental - and constitutional - aspect of regulating the
national health insurance or healthcare market under the first two
categories. Or, the categories themselves may not be so doctrinally separate,
but instead broadly descriptive of what counts as commerce that Congress
can regulate.
This article examines these alternatives, because how a majority of the
Justices frame the doctrinal question is likely to decide the case. The next
section examines the plenary nature of the Commerce Clause, whose scope
the Supreme Court has described in various ways, not all of them perfectly
congruent with the three-category formulation, and classic examples of
regulating commerce, viewed as falling into the first two categories. Part
three considers how the requirement could be found constitutional under
those categories, while part four explores whether the Necessary and Proper
Clause is necessary to do so. Part five considers arguments using the third
category, differentiating laws targeting intrastate matters alone from those
that include intrastate matters in more comprehensive legislation, and finds
that the latter approach implicates arguments that better fit the first two
categories. The article concludes that the ACA's individual coverage
requirement is best viewed as an ancillary regulation to carry out the ACA's

5. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (citations omitted). The parties also
cite United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-9 (1995) (restating the third category to
include "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, [citation
omitted], i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce"); Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1,20 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
6. Thomas More Law Ctr., supra note 4, at 27; Mead, supra note 4, at 29.
7. See Anthony Edward Falcone, Comment: Law andLimits: How CategoriesConstruct
ConstitutionalMeaning, 8 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 1005 (2006).
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goals of making health care affordable, as financed by insurance, and not as
an independent intrastate regulation of individuals that must qualify as
economic activity.
II.

DEFINING COMMERCE: CHANNELS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES AND
VARIATIONS ON THOSE THEMES

The ACA should at least raise the question of whether Congress is
regulating the use of channels of interstate commerce or instrumentalities,
people or things in interstate commerce, rather than only regulating an
intrastate matter that may affect interstate commerce. Although an historical
analysis of the first two categories is beyond the scope of this article,
several conclusions can be drawn without fear of significant disagreement.
First, as Chief Justice John Marshall made clear in Gibbons v. Ogden, the
Commerce Clause grants Congress a plenary power, one that is not subject
to any limitations, except those imposed by the Constitution itself, such as
prohibitions on violating rights protected by the Amendments to the
Constitution:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.... If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a
8
single government... .
While we repeat the mantra that the federal government is a government
of enumerated powers, we should remember that, with respect to the powers
that are enumerated, the federal government is indeed the supreme
sovereign.9
How, then, might Congress's commerce power be limited? One answer
is that, being a sovereign power, it cannot be limited.o Otherwise, the best
answer appears to lie in the definition of commerce. However, a limited

8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-7 (1824).
9. McCulloch, supra note 1, at 405 ("If any one proposition could command the
universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this - that the government of the
union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.").
10. Testimony of Charles Fried, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing: The
Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (Feb. 2, 2011), http://judiciary.
Senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735dal65e3b7. But see RANDY
E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2005)

(arguing for narrower power).
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definition of commerce does not limit the power conferred; it defines the
sphere in which virtually unlimited power can be exercised." Here we
might pause to note that the Tenth Amendment cannot serve as an
independent limit on the scope of the commerce power, because the
commerce power was not reserved to the states.12 Thus, we are returned to
the definition of commerce. Although the Supreme Court has been sensitive
to preserve state sovereignty, it has not allowed that sensitivity to override
the scope of federal power. 13
Of course, the conception of commerce evolved over time, as the country
industrialized and Supreme Court heard challenges to new national
regulation.14 Nevertheless, the Court accepted that some intrastate activities
were part of interstate commerce.' 5 By 1941, efforts to limit the definition
of commerce were abandoned, and "the broader view of the Commerce
Clause announced by Chief Justice Marshall had been restored." 16 Since
that time, the Court has not placed explicit boundaries around the industries,
activities, practices, or matters that constitute commerce itself. Instead, it
has described commerce in more general terms, later summarized in the
first two Perez/Lopez categories.
Attempts to assign the targets of regulation to one of the first two
categories can be vexing. Few Supreme Court decisions explicitly sorted
matters into a single category, even when the Justices agreed that something
11. Gibbons, supra note 8, at 35 ("If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, is vested in congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same
restrictions on the exercise of power as are found in the constitution of the United States").
12. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("If a power is delegated to
Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of
that power to the States"); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (rejecting
argument that Tenth Amendment is a general limit on federal enumerated powers). See Mark
A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1825, 1859
(2011). But see Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Health Insurance
Mandate is Unconstitutional,5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 581 (2011).
13. Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1640 (April 19,
2011) ("Denial of sovereign immunity, to be sure, offends the dignity of a State; but not
every offense to the dignity of a State constitutes a denial of sovereign immunity").
14. See generally EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 186-217 (Lon L. Fuller ed., 1968); John E. Nowak et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

161_(2d ed. 1983).
15. See e.g., Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351
(intrastate rates) (hereinafter "Shreveport Rate Case"); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (impure or adulterated food and drugs); Southern Ry. Co. v.
States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911) (railroad car safety devices); Swift & Co. v. United
196 U.S. 375 (1905) (stockyards).
16.

(1914)
States,
United
States,

Perez, supra note 5, at 151. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

811 (3d ed. 2000) (commenting that definitions in cases involving only intrastate activities
may have seemed too arbitrary to withstand analysis).
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qualified as a matter of interstate commerce.17 People and things that travel
across state lines have always been seen as constituting interstate
commerce.' 8 The routes of that travel - first highways and navigable waters,
then wires, radio frequencies, and air, and now fiber optics and cyberspace
- provide the "channels" through which commerce is conducted, including
routes within a single state that connect with other routes that enter other
states. And in Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court upheld a
prohibition against racial discrimination in the case of a local motel,
confirming that "[t]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been
frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question."l9
The regulation of "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce suggests an
even broader scope. In The Daniel Ball, the Court upheld safety regulations
on a ship that was used only intrastate on a river in Michigan.20 It was an
"instrument" of interstate commerce, because it was used as one segment of
the transport for goods being shipped from state to state. Anything that
travels these routes could be what the Court called an "instrument of that
commerce,"21 including personal information, 22 and insurance policies.23
Companies, including producers and manufacturers, that use the channels of
interstate commerce can be instruments of commerce. 24 The Court has
described Congress's commerce power in broad terms. Even the intrastate
business of interstate "instrumentalities" can be regulated when "essential
or appropriate . . . to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the

maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be
conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance."25
The cases have been more consistent in calling something part of
interstate commerce than in specifically categorizing it as a channel,
17. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Case, supra note 15, at 342; Interstate Commerce Comm.
v. Illinois C. R. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 474 (1910) (upholding Congress's power to regulate the
railway cars used by a railroad company that is engaged in interstate commerce).

18. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 325-26 (1913) (upholding the White Slave
Act); Hipolite, supra note 15, at 58; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 354 (1903)
(upholding prohibition on interstate shipment of lottery tickets) (hereinafter "The Lottery
Case").
19. Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)).
20. The Daniel Ball 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1871).
21. Id. at 565.
22. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
23. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
24. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 5 (1939).
25. Shreveport Rate Case, supra note 15, at 351. See also United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (upholding regulation of the price of milk sold intrastate);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
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instrumentality or activity affecting interstate commerce.2 6 Further
complicating the picture are Supreme Court decisions that cite cases that
could plausibly fall into the third category as authority for one of the first
two categories.2 7 Litigants have also had trouble slotting their arguments
into the correct category. An interesting example of category confusion is
United States v. Robertson,28 a per curiam opinion upholding Robertson's
conviction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) for his dealings with an investment in a gold mine. The Court
pointed out that the parties had been incorrect to argue the case under the
third category, because the gold mine was a business engaged in interstate
commerce and subject to regulation under the first two categories.
III.

VIEWING THE ACA UNDER THE FIRST Two CATEGORIES

Another conclusion is that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
regulate the health insurance industry and impose terms and conditions on
insurers, how they do business, and their insurance policies.29 In
Southeastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court did not place insurance in a
specific category, perhaps because it was so convinced that the insurance
industry was engaged in interstate commerce.30 The Court may have
considered insurance companies themselves or their marketing,
negotiations, and payments, or the insurance policies or their
implementation to be instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or it may
have considered insurance companies to be using the channels of interstate
commerce to carry out their business. Either way, it was commerce.
Moreover, the Court rejected, as "metaphysical separation," the possibility
of separating local activities, such as selling contracts, from interstate
activities.31 The Court saw insurance as an integrated enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce:
26. Lopez, supra note5, at 553-58 (summarizing pre-1971 cases without slotting them
into categories).
27. Id. at 558 (citing Darby, supra note 25 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra note 19, as
examples of regulating "the use of the channels of interstate commerce").
28. United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671 (1995).
29. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra note 23, at 583 (upholding the application
of the Sherman Antitrust Act to fire insurance companies). Congress has regulated health
insurance. See, e.g., Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001 et seq. (establishing federal requirements for health and other benefit plans offered by
private employers); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. (establishing requirements for
private health insurance plans).
30. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra note 23, at 549-50 ("Not only, then, may
transactions be commerce though non-commercial; they may be commerce though illegal
and sporadic, and though they do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of
anything more tangible than electrons and information.").
31. Id. at 537.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol21/iss1/7

6

Mariner: The Affordable Care Act Individual Coverage Requirement: Ways to

2012]1

Individual Coverage Requirement

51

The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the
states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy
obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are
essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts. Individual
policyholders living in many different states who own policies in a single
company have their separate interests blended in one assembled fund of
assets upon which all are equally dependent for payment of their policies.
The decisions which that company makes at its home office - the risks it
insures, the premiums it charges, the investments it makes, the losses it
pays - concern not just the people of the state where the home office
happens to be located. They concern people living far beyond the
boundaries of that state .32 .. In short, a nationwide business is not
deprived of its interstate character 33merely because it is built upon sales
contracts which are local in nature.
The health insurance industry today is engaged in interstate commerce.
The top five commercial companies (including Blue Cross) have enrolled
about one-third of the United States population (101,784,209 in 2008) in
their health insurance plans.34 The top thirty companies cover more than
180 million Americans.
The ACA regulates the sale, marketing,
administration and content of private, commercial health insurance plans,
including required coverage, prohibited exclusions, premium rate corridors,
medical loss ratios, co-insurance, and appeal procedures. It creates
incentives for states to establish health insurance exchanges to facilitate the
sale of policies, reserving the power to establish a federal health insurance
exchange where states do not create their own.36 It also regulates public
health benefit plans - Medicare and Medicaid - expanding eligibility and
coordinating with private plans. 3 7
The ACA uses health insurance as a mechanism for financing health
care, rather than a target for market price stabilization alone. It is premised
on the assumption that everyone will need health care at some time 39 and
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 541-2.
Id. at 546.
D. ANDREW

AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY (Nov. 17, 2009),

availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40834.pdf.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 18022; 42 U.S.C. § 18081(b)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(c)(3); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-27(e)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 18002 (c)(6).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c).
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII) (Medicaid eligibility for adults up to
133 percent FPL).
38. Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What's Insurance Got to Do with It?
Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 436
(2010).
39. See U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH & HUMAN SRVCS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV.,
SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
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that health care has become so expensive that few people can pay for that
care out of their own resources. 40 The ACA incorporates multiple
provisions intended to limit the costs (or rate of increase) to health insurers,
so that their premiums (and Medicare and Medicaid payments) stabilize and
increase at a slower rate. 4 1 These are designed to ensure that insurance
financing remains available in the private market. But Congress could have
stabilized premium prices and prohibited unfair competition without
imposing benefit coverage requirements. The requirements to cover
essentially all reasonable care is intended to make sure that everyone has a
source of payment for the health care they need.42
The ACA is a complex regulatory scheme, which weaves insurance
regulation and the individual coverage requirement into a larger, integrated
program regulating federal health benefit programs, providers of health
care, employers, and public health services. It should be clear that Congress
has the power to enact the ACA regulations of the health insurance
industry. But it does not answer the question whether it can require people
to buy health insurance policies (or pay a penalty). Of course, the
individual coverage requirement was added to preserve affordability by
preventing individuals from triggering large losses by buying insurance
only when they suffered a costly illness or injury.43 Insurance, whether in
the form of private policies or public benefit programs, is a natural source
of financing for health care, because it is the preferred mechanism for
financing unpredictable losses." Affordable premiums from a large number

2009 14 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalseries/sr_10/srI0249.pdf
(less than 1 percent of adults have never used health care). People who refuse medical care
for religious reasons, unlawful immigrants, those with very low income, incarcerated
prisoners, and Indian Tribe members are exempted from the coverage requirement. 26
U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d) (2010). Those lucky enough not to need care are the exception to the
rule.
40. National health expenditures ("NHE") reached $2.5 trillion in 2009 ($8,086 per
person), accounting for 17.6 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. U.S. Dep't. of Health &
Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditure Data,
NHE Fact Sheet, (June 14, 2011), https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpend
Data/25_NHEFact Sheet.asp. These expenditures are expected to grow at more than the
rate of inflation in the absence of regulatory controls.
41. In 2009, private health insurance spending was $801.2 billion (32 percent of NHE),
while out-of-pocket expenditures reached $299.3 billion (12 percent of total NHE), and
Medicare and Medicaid accounted for a total of 35 percent of NHE. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (essential health benefits for qualified plans). See INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001).
43. See Brief for Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae supporting Respondent, Liberty
Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir., Feb. 25, 2011).
44. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1986); MALCOLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE LAW (1997).
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of people can be used to pay for the expensive care needed by the few. 45
But the requirement that insurers sell to anyone at any time would threaten
the affordability of premiums, the financial stability of insurance
companies, and the insurance market. Congress could not achieve the goals
of both premium affordability and universal coverage without having
virtually everyone contribute to the payment scheme, either by buying a
policy or paying a penalty.
If Congress can regulate health insurance as part of interstate commerce,
then arguably, in the exercise of its plenary power, it can adopt any rule that
reasonably furthers its regulation. In 1939, the Court concluded, "[a]ny rule,
such as that embodied in the [Agricultural Adjustment] Act, which is
intended to foster, protect and conserve that commerce, or to prevent the
flow of commerce from working harm to the people of the nation, is within
the competence of Congress.46 Read literally, this conclusion could
encompass the individual coverage requirement - as an ancillary rule that
protects the insurance market or even the national health care market.
There is little doubt that Congress can regulate individual behavior. 47 The
harder questions are whether the individuals must already be engaged in
interstate commerce or have entered a market and whether there is a
constitutionally cognizable difference between prohibiting and requiring
action. As to the first question, in many cases decided on the basis of the
first two categories, the regulated individuals were engaged in a regulated
industry.4 8 It is well established, however, that Congress can prohibit people
from taking things across state lines in order to protect the stream of
commerce from deleterious items. 49 The Court has upheld the ban on
transporting women across state lines for immoral purposes, finding that
Congress can use even means that are typically associated with the states'
police power to regulate interstate commerce.o Many federal laws, both
civil and criminal, simply prohibit anyone from taking a specific action.51
45. See Nat'1 Inst. For Health Care Mgmt., Understanding U.S. Health Care Spending 3
(July 2011), available at http://nihcm.org/images/stories/NIHCM-CostBrief-Email.pdf
(reporting the proportions of the population accounting for health spending).
46. Mulford, supra note 24, at 48.
47. See Hall, supra note 12, at 1859.
48. See e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., supranote 26, at 381.
49. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 439 (1925) (driving a stolen car across state
lines); United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 466 - 67 (1920) (carrying whisky across
state lines in a private automobile); The Lottery Case, supra note 18 (interstate shipment of
lottery tickets). The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., prohibits the
manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or possession of a controlled substance, except in
accordance with specific exceptions, such as a physician's prescription or for research.
Raich, supra note 5 (no facial challenge to the Act itself).
50. Hoke, supra note 18, at 323.
51. See e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et
seq. (2010).
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Therefore, the more salient question appears to be whether Congress can
require people do something.
Federal laws impose requirements on individuals under other enumerated
powers. The power to organize, arm and discipline a militia has been used
to require individuals to procure their own weapons.5 2 The draft was a valid
exercise of the power to raise and support armies.s3 The power of eminent
domain requires individuals to give up their property. 54 If Congress can
require individuals to do something to carry out its other enumerated
powers, can it require individuals to enter a market as part of its enumerated
power to regulate that market? And is the relevant market the market for
health insurance or health care or both? 5
More perplexing is whether a requirement can be distinguished from a
prohibition. The federal civil commitment that the Court upheld in United
States v. Comstock56 could be seen as prohibiting a person from leaving
confinement after his sentence is completed or as requiring a person to enter
civil confinement. The distinction undoubtedly makes no difference to the
person confined. In Wickard v. Filburn,the Court rejected the assertion that
the quota on wheat production forced farmers to buy wheat in the market,
instead of allowing them to grow their own.57 But Filburn had a point.
Even though he might have been free to buy corn instead of wheat, he had
to buy something to eat.
Possessing something may differ little from doing nothing. In Lopez, the
Court viewed possession of a firearm as distinct from obtaining a firearm
from the stream of commerce.
Would the Court consider the crime of
possessing marijuana to be a penalty for doing nothing and therefore
beyond Congress's power? The Controlled Substances Act's blanket
prohibition of possession of controlled substances has not been facially
challenged on Commerce Clause grounds.5 9 In Gonzales v. Raich, however,
52. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 16.
53. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12; Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
54. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 679 (1896) (finding it
necessary and proper to carry out other federal powers); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367,
377 (1876) (upholding the power without linking it to an enumerated power).
55. The choice of category for reviewing the cases may depend on which interstate
market the ACA's insurance coverage requirement supports. So far, court decisions have
split on this question. State of Florida, supra note 4, at 86 (health insurance market); Thomas
More Law Center, supra note 4 (health insurance and health care markets); Mead, supra
note 4, at 39.
56. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
57. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
58. Lopez, supra note 5, at 561. The Court emphasized the fact that the statute had no
jurisdictional element connecting that possession with interstate commerce. Id. Congress
later amended the statute to govern possession of a "firearm that has moved in or otherwise
affects interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
59. Raich, supra note 5, at 1 (2005) (applied challenge limited to the Act's application to
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the Court upheld the application of the prohibition on cultivating marijuana
as a necessary element to prohibit the illegal market for marijuana.co A
major distinction between the Lopez and Raich prohibitions appears to be
the latter's inclusion in a larger program of regulating interstate commerce.
That reasoning should apply to possession as well as cultivation of
marijuana. One named respondent did not grow or purchase marijuana, but
received it from others for free and merely possessed it, but the Court
ignored those facts. This suggests that Congress can regulate possession
when the item possessed is subject to regulation in accordance with a larger
regulatory program. Does this mean that Congress has the power to regulate
individuals who are taking no action at all? Or must a person already
possess something to come within the sphere of regulation?
IV.

IS THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE NECESSARY?

Another difficult question is whether Congress could regulate individuals
in the direct exercise of its commerce power alone or whether it could do so
only by also exercising the Necessary and Proper Clause. 61 There is an
argument that Congress has implied power to choose the means by which it
exercises its enumerated powers, even without the Clause. 62 However, there
is little to be gained by not relying on the Clause, because it still grants
Congress considerable discretion to choose reasonable means.63 In Chief
Justice Marshall's classic words:
But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the

patients using marijuana for medical purposes as authorized by California state law).
Possession is a separate offense from sale and distribution. The Controlled Substances Act of
1970,21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a).
60. Raich, supra note 5, at 37.
61. "Congress shall have power .. . To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof"
U.S. CONsT., art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
62. McCulloch, supra note 1, at 406 ("there is no phrase in the whole instrument [the
Constitution] which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied
powers.").
63. See Hall, supra note 12, at 1840-64. But see Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003) (arguing
that that the Clause requires more than a rational relationship to the regulatory goal); Gary
Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, available at
ssrn.com/abstract-l 869243 (same).
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scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 64
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Raich, said that "the
commerce power permits Congress not only to devise rules for the
governance of commerce between States but also to facilitate interstate
commerce by eliminating potential obstructions, and to restrict it by
eliminating potential stimulants." 65 This reasoning is worth considering,
even if the majority opinion did not adopt it.
Since Raich, the Court used the Clause to uphold federal civil
commitment of federal prisoners who were sexually dangerous, after their
prison terms expire.66 Justice Breyer's majority opinion reasoned that "the
statute is a 'necessary and proper' means of exercising the federal authority
that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish their
violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those
imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned
but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others." 67 Justice
Kennedy, concurring, wrote, "the analysis depends not on the number of
links in the congressional-power chain but on the strength of the chain."68
But, he added, "[t]he inferences must be controlled by some limitations lest,
as Thomas Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely
unbounded by linking one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable game
of 'this is the house that Jack built."' 69 However, no limitations appear in
the opinion, and the many links appear rather fragile.70
If Comstock represents the rule going forward, it should be relatively
easy to link the ACA's requirement to maintain health benefit coverage to
the Commerce Clause. Of course, it is possible that most Supreme Court
Justices find sexually dangerous persons, like illegal drug users, so
offensive that they are willing to stretch constitutional boundaries - or add
links to the necessary and proper chain - to uphold federal regulation that
they would not countenance if applied to other persons. If so, the Justices
should provide a credible distinction that depends on something other than
distaste for sexual violence and drugs. In particular, they might consider
64. McCulloch, supra note 1, at 421.
65. Raich, supra note 5, at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
67. Id. at 1965.
68. Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J.).
69. Id.
70. See llya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and
the Limits of Federal Power, CATO SUP. CT. REv., 2009-2010, at 239, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2010/Somin-on-Comstock.pdf (arguing that the court's
reasoning stretched the connections too far).
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why there has been no challenge to the federal law authorizing the
involuntary isolation and quarantine of people entering the U.S. or crossing
state lines who are believed to harbor a dangerous, contagious disease.n
The Court has recognized that Congress can regulate the price of a
commodity by regulating either supply or demand, or both.72 The ACA
coverage requirement regulates demand, while other provisions regulate
prices, both directly and indirectly. The states that have tried to establish
insurance exchanges without requiring individuals to obtain coverage have
not been successful. The individual mandate is not a freestanding statute,
but a narrow addition to a reticulated statute creating a comprehensive
regulatory scheme that is itself wholly within Congress's commerce power.
Indeed, there would be no reasonfor the mandate in the absence of the rest
of the ACA provisions regulatinginsurance.
V.

THE THIRD CATEGORY: INTRASTATE ACTIVITIES AFFECTING
INTERSTATE COMMERCE

So far, all courts that have issued opinions have framed the Commerce
Clause question as asking whether the individual mandate meets the criteria
of the third category - affecting interstate commerce.74 This treats the
mandate as though it were an isolated statute regulating one exclusively
intrastate matter, as in Lopez. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that the third category includes two subcategories: (1) "economic activity,
even if wholly intrastate, if it substantially affects interstate commerce";
and (2) "non-economic intrastate activity if doing so is essential to a larger
scheme that regulates economic activity."75 Other courts and parties have
taken a similar approach, relying on Wickard and Raich. When Wickard
was decided, however, the Court's Commerce Clause opinions were more
general, and the categories had not been explicitly differentiated. The
Raich majority claimed to use the third category, but actually decided the
case on the above second subcategory.
71. Public Health Service Act, § 361(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264(b). In oral
argument in Comstock, Justices Scalia and Kennedy made comments indicating their
assumption that federal involuntary commitment of people with a contagious disease would
be a legitimate exercise of the commerce power, because contagious diseases clearly affect
interstate commerce. Justice Scalia said, "I mean, if anything relates to interstate commerce,
it's communicable diseases, it seems to me."
72. See, e.g., Wickard, supra note 57, at 127 ("The maintenance by government
regulation of a price for wheat undoubtedly can be accomplished as effectively by sustaining
or increasing the demand as by limiting the supply").
73. See Brief for the Am. Assoc. of People with Disabilities as Amici Curiae supporting
Respondent, Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir., Feb. 25, 2011).
74. Thomas More Law Center, supra note 4, at 27; Mead, supra note 4, at 29.
75. Thomas More Law Center, supra note 4, at 27.
76. Raich, supra note 5, at 17.
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The first subcategory in the Sixth Circuit's formulation - intrastate
economic activity - appears to explain only those cases in which federal
legislation regulates an intrastate activity alone, apart from any other
regulation of interstate commerce, as in Lopez and Morrison. That is not
true of the ACA's individual coverage requirement. As noted above,
Congress would not have enacted the requirement by itself. If the first
subcategory does not apply, then there is no reason to consider whether the
individual coverage requirement is either economic or an activity at all.
However, the courts that have upheld the individual coverage requirement
have done so, concluding that the choice to obtain or reject coverage is
itself an economic decision.77 Given uncertainty about whether the Supreme
Court's conception of an economic activity requires affirmative action,
instead of more abstract decision-making, it is not surprising that the
government also relies on the second subcategory to uphold the coverage
requirement.7 8
The second subcategory appears to restate the conclusion that Congress
can regulate ancillary intrastate matters as part of its more comprehensive
regulation of interstate commerce - commerce that falls within the first two
primary categories: uses of channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. 79 For example, cases like the Shreveport Rate case and Southern
Railway Co. are cited as examples of upholding the regulation of
instrumentalities (railroads) even though the issue before the Court was
solely whether their intrastate activity could be regulated.80 Similarly,
although Darby is cited as an example of upholding the regulation of the
use of channels of interstate commerce, the Court considered and upheld
only the regulation of employment practices within a state. 81 Congress has
plenary power to regulate matters that are clearly part of interstate
commerce, like health insurance and probably health care, and that
regulation may apply to matters within a state to achieve Congress's goals,
with or possibly without the exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause
77. Thomas More Law Center, supra note 4, at 16. ("the financing of health care
services, and specifically the practice of self-insuring, is economic activity."); Mead, supra
note 4, at 33; Liberty Univ., supra note 4, at 633.
78. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center, supra note 4, at 12-13; Mead, supra note 4, at
35 ("the individual mandate is best viewed not as a stand-alone reform, but as an essential
element of the larger regulatory scheme contained in the ACA"); Liberty Univ., supra note
4, at 634.
79. See Raich, supra note 5, at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("the authority to enact laws
necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws
governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary
to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those
intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce").
80. Lopez, supra note 5, at 558.
81. See, e.g., Darby,supra note 25 (upholding legislation regulating wages and hours for
employees).
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power. If this interpretation is correct, then the Sixth Circuit's second
subcategory is the only relevant category for analyzing the ACA's
individual mandate, and the individual mandate could be upheld as an
essential element of a broader regulatory scheme on the basis of analyses
like those presented in parts three and four above.
A more precise interpretation, however, could view the second
subcategory not as part of the third category at all, but rather as the
application of constitutional regulation of instrumentalities of interstate
commerce to incidental intrastate matters. 8 2 Keeping the second
subcategory within the confines of the third category runs the risk of
conflating the requirements for the two subcategories. This may explain
why so much energy has been spent arguing for and against the idea that the
individual mandate regulates an economic activity. However, if Congress
has plenary power to regulate the national market in health insurance, as it
surely does, and to protect health insurers and to set standards for the
policies they sell, as it surely does, then there does not appear to be
anything in the Commerce Clause that would forbid Congress from
regulating individuals as one of several means to carry out its
comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce. Arguments over
"economic" and "activity" are not relevant.84
The Raich majority noted, "When Congress decides that the 'total
incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate
the entire class."8 This appears to fit within the first subcategory of the
third category.86 But, the Court concluded with a second subcategory
summary: "when a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
82. See Raich, supra note 5, at 34, 37 (Scalia J., dissenting).
83. See Wendy K. Mariner & George J. Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal
Court,363 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1300 (2010).
84. The relevance of a distinction between activity and inactivity is being questioned.
See State of Florida, supra note 4, at 109 ("we are not persuaded that the formalistic
dichotomy of activity and inactivity provides a workable or persuasive enough answer in this
case. Although the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause cases frequently speak inactivityladen terms, the Court has never expressly held that activity is a precondition for Congress's
ability to regulate commerce .... ); Thomas More Law Center, supra note 4, at 9.
85. Raich, supra note 5, at 17.
86. The Raich Court also quoted Perez, supra note 5, at 154-55, which quoted Westfall
v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927), as saying "When it is necessary in order to
prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may
do so." Raich, supra note 5 at 17. It referred to a "class of activities," which the Court used
in earlier decisions to determine whether intrastate matters should be regulated as part of a
larger regulation of clearly interstate matters. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964). It noted that Congress could properly conclude that leaving individual home use
of marijuana out of the Controlled Substances Act prohibitions, like leaving home grown
wheat out of the Agricultural Adjustment Act's quotas, would destabilize the market. Here, it
found that Congress needs only a rational basis for its conclusion. Raich, supra note 5, at 19.
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that statute is of no consequence," 87 and "we refuse to excise individual
components of that larger scheme." 8 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, noted that the Raich Court said the Controlled
Substances Act created a "closed regulatory system," whereas the ACA
coverage requirement was open-ended and did not apply to everyone.89
More importantly, the Eleventh Circuit found that federalism concerns
required a more precise principle to limit the reach of the Commerce power
over individuals who have not entered a private, commercial market. 90 But
is there a meaningful distinction between regulating people who have
already connected with interstate commerce, as by investing in a company
that does some interstate business, and requiring people who are statistically
likely to buy from a business in interstate commerce in the future (or have
in the past) to do so now? Judge Sutton, in a thoughtful concurrence to the
Sixth Circuit's opinion, thought not. 9 1
Not addressed in the decisions so far is whether the challenge to the
ACA's individual coverage requirement must be analyzed only as a third
category question, and if so, whether the Court recognizes two subgroups
within the third category, as the Sixth Circuit found. In most cases decided
under the third category, the target of federal regulation has been something
within a single state alone, whereas in the first and second categories, the
target of comprehensive regulation is something that is engaged in interstate
commerce. By focusing exclusively on the individual coverage requirement,
the challengers characterize the target of regulation as exclusively intrastate,
as though the individual mandate were a freestanding statute.
The primary argument against treating the individual mandate as a
necessary and proper adjunct to regulating interstate commerce is that there
is no principled limit to Congress's power.92 But the same is true of
Congress's other enumerated powers. Justice Scalia dismissed that concern
on the ground that the commerce power "can only be exercised in
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it
extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation
effective." This may not sound very limiting, but it appears to be
consistent with Congress's sovereign commerce power. It does not mean

87. Raich, supra note 5, at 17 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196, n. 27
(1968)).
88. Raich, supra note 5, at 22.
89. State of Florida, supra note 4, at 13.
90. Id. at 33.
91. Thomas More Law Center, supra note 4 (Sutton, J., concurring).
92. Raich, supra note 5, at 46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Wendy K. Mariner et al.,
Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli? And Why That's a HardQuestion, 364 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 201 (2011).
93. Raich, supra note 5, at 38 (Scalia J., concurring).
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that Congress has the police power, because the enumerated powers do not
encompass the full spectrum of the states' sovereign police powers, and any
federal regulation of individuals could only be justified where necessary to
the effective regulation of interstate commerce. Although, in today's
economy, commerce includes a vast array of enterprises, it does not include
everything governed by the states' police power, such as education, family
law and most criminal offenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The challenges to the individual mandate offer the Supreme Court an
opportunity to refine its doctrinal approach to the Commerce Clause. The
majority could conclude that it should not expand the reach of the
Commerce Clause to uphold the ACA when Congress could have enacted
an obviously constitutional program using its Spending Power, such as by
expanding Medicare eligibility to cover everyone or by imposing an income
tax and granting those with health benefit coverage a tax credit, exemption,
or deduction.94 One could argue that the Court should not distort
constitutional doctrine in order to accommodate a Congress that did not
have the political courage to impose a tax.
On the other hand, constitutional doctrine may not need to be distorted to
uphold the ACA. The fact that Congress has not used its commerce power
to require individuals to have health coverage does not necessarily mean
that it cannot do so.95 By itself, novelty is not unconstitutional. 9 6 The Social
Security Act was both novel and controversial when enacted, but the Court
upheld it as a valid exercise of Congress's power to tax and spend.97 The
Court could view the ACA in the same light and find that the requirement
to maintain health benefit coverage is an appropriate incidental regulation
of the national health care and health insurance industries to enable all

94. Stewart, supra note 13, at 1650 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("I am aware of no
doctrine to the effect that an unconstitutional establishment is insulated from challenge
simply because a constitutional alternative is available").
95. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877). See
Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance (Aug. 1994) , availableat http://www.cbo.gov
/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf ("The government has never required people to buy any
good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States."); Jennifer Staman &
Cynthia Brougher, Congressional Research Service, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health
Insurance:
A Constitutional Analysis,
3 (July 24, 2009),
available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf ("it is a novel issue whether Congress
may use the clause to require an individual to purchase a good or a service.").
96. Stewart, supra note 13, at 1641-42. See also, Hoke, supra note 18, at 320 ("in almost
every instance of the exercise of the [Commerce] power differences are asserted from
previous exercises of it and made a ground of attack").
97. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
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Americans to obtain reasonable health care with affordable financing
mechanisms.
Maybe it is time to be explicit that Congress has the authority to regulate
individual conduct as part of its plenary power over interstate commerce
and not only when that conduct can be characterized as an economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. If Congress has the
power of a sovereign with respect to its enumerated powers, where is the
constitutional limit that bars Congress from regulating individuals? None
has been found other. than the Necessary and Proper Clause and other
constitutional provisions (like the First Amendment and the Due Process
Clause). This may be unsettling. But it is the same principle that applies to
all other enumerated powers. If correct, the individual coverage requirement
must be constitutional. If not, the Supreme Court must explain why
Congress can prohibit individual conduct, but cannot compel it, when
necessary to regulate interstate commerce.
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Taming the Beast of Health Care Costs:
Why Medicare Reform Alone is Not Enough
Susan A. Channick*
I.

THE PROBLEM

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act' ("ACA") has, as its
primary goal, universal access to health insurance for all American citizens
and legal residents. When fully implemented, the ACA will provide
insurance to an additional 32 million people who are currently uninsured
and to many millions of others who are underinsured. While universal
health insurance is certainly a public health goal that this country has
sought for many decades, the additional lives that will be added to the
insurance rolls as well as new minimum coverage requirements mandated
by the ACA will create fiscal burdens for the already expensive U.S.
healthcare system. In 2009, Americans spent $2.5 trillion or 17.6 percent of
gross domestic product ("GDP") on health care, a number that is predicted
to continue to rise absent serious interventions. 2 The ever-escalating costs
of health care as well as the anticipated costs of healthcare reform for the
additional 32 million Americans who will be required to have health
insurance by 2014 may well prove to be a crucial tipping point for an
already fiscally overblown healthcare system.
The imperative of cost containment for the entire American healthcare
system has been well-documented for quite some time, but recently,
spending on federal healthcare programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and

Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; Cornell University, B.A.; California
Western School of Law, J.D.; Harvard University School of Public Health, M.P.H.
1. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001) [hereinafter ACA].
2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
AGGREGATE TI (2011), availableat http://www.cms.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf
3. The CBO has estimated that health care reform will cost in excess of $1 trillion over
the next decade but eventually reduce the budget deficit because of decreases in the costs of
health insurance and other cost saving provisions of the legislation. CBO's Analysis of the
Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010 Before the Subcomm. on Health &
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 3 (Mar. 30, 2011), (statement of
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, CBO), availableat http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo56
90/03-30-HealthCareLegislation.pdf.
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